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THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGY

William C. Martel

Ikenberry, G. John, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. Forging a
World of Liberty under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21st
Century: Final Report of the Princeton Project on National Security (plus seven Working Group Reports). Princeton, N.J.:
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
27 September 2006. 96pp. Available at www.wws.princeton
.edu/ppns/report.html

The Princeton Project on National Security describes itself as a “three-year, bipartisan initiative to develop a sustainable and effective national security strategy for the United States of America.” Consisting of the final report and seven
working group reports (on Grand Strategic Choices, State Security and Transnational Threats, Economics and National Security,
William C. Martel is an associate professor of internaReconstruction and Development, Anti-Americanism,
tional security studies at the Fletcher School, Tufts UniRelative Threat Assessment, and Foreign Infrastrucversity, Medford, Massachusetts. He received his
doctorate in international relations from the University
ture and Global Institutions), this study, like so many
of Massachusetts (Amherst) and was a postdoctoral felothers, wrestles with the great unresolved problem
low at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Formerly a professor of national security affairs
that plagues contemporary policy makers and scholat the Naval War College, Dr. Martel has held the Alan
ars: What is the central organizing principle behind
Shepard Chair of Space Technology and Policy Studies;
American national security policy?
directed a number of studies on space and policy issues
for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Declaring that their aim was to “write a collective
(DARPA), the U.S. Air Force, and the Office of Secre‘X article’” (a reference to George Kennan’s “The
tary of Defense; and was a member of the professional
Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in Foreign Afstaff of the RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C.
His most recent book is Victory in War: Foundations
fairs in July 1947), the codirectors of the Princeton
of Modern Military Policy (2007).
Project sought to “do together what no one person in
our highly specialized and rapidly changing world
Naval War College Review, Summer 2007, Vol. 60, No. 3

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007

T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2007\Ventura\NWC Review Summer 2007.vp
Thursday, July 26, 2007 8:50:49 AM

1

Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite Default screen

124

Naval War College Review, Vol. 60 [2007], No. 3, Art. 9

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

could hope to do alone.” The central arguments of this study fall into several predictable categories. Beginning with the premise that the world lacks a “single organizing principle for foreign policy” and seeking to remedy this deficiency by
bringing order to the chaos surrounding grand strategy, the project stipulates
that the “basic objective of U.S. strategy” is to “protect the American people and
the American way of life.” It describes “three more specific aims” of American
strategy as a “secure homeland,” “healthy global economy,” and “benign international environment.”
The study goes on to define “six basic criteria” that must be implemented.
This strategy must be “multidimensional,” “integrated,” “interest-based rather
than threat-based,” “grounded in hope rather than fear,” “pursued inside-out,”
and “adapted to the information age.” What emerges from this framework is the
commonsensical and unremarkable conclusion about the fundamental principle of American foreign policy—that “America must stand for, seek, and secure
a world of liberty under law,” because a world inhabited by “mature liberal democracies” will make the American people “safer, richer, and healthier.” To implement “liberty under law,” the project proposes three broad sets of policies.
First, governments must be brought up to PAR (acronym for “popular, accountable, and rights-regarding governments”). Reaffirming that “democracy is
the best instrument that humans have devised for ensuring individual liberty,”
U.S. strategy must foster the “preconditions” necessary for successful liberal democracies, and those conditions go “far beyond” merely holding elections.
Second, a liberal order must be built that, resting on a system of international
institutions, diminishes the ability of one state to wield unilaterally the power
that breeds “resentment, fear, and resistance.” The ability to build this liberal order depends on establishing a global “concert of democracies” that will “institutionalize and ratify the ‘democratic peace.’”
Third, the United States, and presumably the self-selected members of the
concert of democracies, must rethink the role of force in international politics.
Beyond the sensible argument that “liberty and law must be backed up by force,”
the study holds that the United States must retreat from the principle of military
primacy, while building the collective military might of the liberal democracies.
If successful, the United States can avoid the destabilizing consequences that
flowed from great-power competition during the Cold War. In practical terms,
the study recommends that policy makers and scholars update the doctrine of
deterrence and “develop new guidelines on the preventive use of force against
terrorists and extreme states.”
The analytical framework developed in Forging a World of Liberty under Law
concludes with a discussion of “major threats and challenges,” which fall into the
usual categories of the Middle East, global terror networks, the proliferation and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/9
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transfer of nuclear weapons, the rise of China and order in East Asia, global pandemics, sources of energy, and a protective infrastructure.
In addition to the final report, several of the working group reports also merit
examination. The report of the working group on grand strategic choices,
cochaired by Francis Fukuyama of Johns Hopkins University and G. John
Ikenberry of Princeton, focuses on the eminently worthy question: “Toward
what ends should America use its power, invest its resources, and concert its energies?” Among its several key findings are that “East Asia is likely to pose the
greatest challenges to the United States”; that Washington needs to “move toward
an Asia-centric grand strategy”; and that the “ongoing war in Iraq” is the “main
stumbling block” toward a strategic shift in American strategy. If these conclusions appear commonplace, so too are some of the report’s recommendations—
such as that the United States “ought to be very careful” about the preemptive
and preventive use of force, “institutions are the tools of American power [and]
we must relearn the benefits of multilateralism,” and the war on terrorism is a
“global counterinsurgency” rather than a “clash of civilizations.” The argument
that the United States should rebuild a “series of new grand bargains” with other
democracies, however, is worthy of deeper consideration.
The report of the working group on anti-Americanism, cochaired by Tod
Lindberg of the Hoover Institution and Suzanne Nossel of the Security and
Peace Institute, examines the rise of anti-Americanism and its effects on American policy. It discusses the varieties of anti-Americanism, its effects and implications for violence and its economic and political impacts, responses to
anti-Americanism, and recommendations for dealing with the problem. Not a
systematic analysis of global public opinion, this report essentially restates data
collected by the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys since the late 1990s. Its entirely
predictable conclusion is that “many forms of anti-Americanism may be addressed only through changes in substantive U.S. policies.” However, since this
analysis concludes that it is “difficult to measure how much tangible friction
anti-Americanism” creates for U.S. foreign policy, its broad observations are
hardly reassuring unless we know whether anti-Americanism is a transient phenomenon or simply a reaction to Washington’s current policies toward Iraq and
in waging the global war on terror.
By far the most analytical and interesting report is that on economics and national security, cochaired by Adam Posen of the Institute for International Economics and Daniel K. Tarullo of Georgetown University. Against the backdrop
of the relative economic influence of Asian states whose power is “shifting gradually but steadily,” the report proposes that the United States integrate economic
policy into national security policy in its governmental and interagency processes, arguing that the importance of integrating these policies is “self-evident.”
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
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It discusses the reasons for integration and examines impediments and challenges to the United States in formulating and implementing global economic
policy. Also outlined are suggestions for strengthening linkages between economic and national security policies. Fundamentally, the report suggests that
“traditional foreign policy thinking [about economics as a tool of statecraft]
must change” because the influence of economics in national security is on the
ascent.
Outlined are four “generally valid assumptions”: “globalization of the economy increases both U.S. capabilities and U.S. vulnerabilities”; Washington’s
“ability to restrict commerce and technology transfer to other countries is more
limited”; “international economic development and integration should enhance U.S. national security”; and “U.S. economic policy mistakes” affect national security. Also examined are five “mistaken or misleading assumptions”
about economics and national security: American security is “threatened by relatively faster economic growth in other parts of the world”; “economic development policies abroad” enhance U.S. security; globalization has made the U.S.
economy “vulnerable to the fate, practices, and whims of other countries”; as
has been prosaically observed, “economic trends and capabilities are changing
rapidly”; and as has been more trenchantly noted, economic globalization
makes “economic sanctions and similar measures applied by the United States . . .
more effective.” As the study concludes, “it is more accurate to say that a globalized economy magnified the effects of our own policies, positive and negative.”
Each of these developments has had profound consequences for national security. One is that U.S. interagency processes fail to integrate economic policy
into the “guiding principles” that policy makers should use to balance properly
economic and traditional security interests. Arguing that policy makers have
generally dismissed economic policy as a “lower” form of security policy, this report identifies the National Economic Council as precisely the type of “institutional bridge” needed to integrate economics and foreign policy. This report also
outlines significant economic problems facing the United States, notably budget
deficits, low personal savings rate, its status as the world’s largest debtor nation,
and Washington’s dependence on global markets for investing in the United
States and thereby supporting its spending habits. All these trends mask the dangerous possibility that the ability of the United States to harness its economic
power in pursuit of global “goods” is in decline. In addition, highlighted by
China’s gradual ascent into the ranks of the most powerful states, the report examines how China’s growth as a potential global superpower could have significant implications for U.S. policies. In broad terms, it argues that Washington
must carefully redefine how it uses economic power to support a broad global
agenda.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/9
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All in all, Forging a World of Liberty under Law offers a comprehensive analysis
of how to organize American thinking in the aftermath of the Cold War. The architects of this study are to be commended for the breadth and depth of their
systematic efforts to examine the principal problems in global politics. That
said, policy makers and scholars must consider several criticisms as they contemplate whether this study provides the intellectual foundations for a fundamental realignment of U.S. national security policy.
The study elevates the idea of promoting liberal democracies and organizing
them into a “concert of democracies” as the paramount objective of American
strategy. However, this emphasis on democracy, liberty, and the rule of law is a
long-standing principle in American strategy. The defeat of totalitarian regimes
in World War II, the Marshall Plan, NATO and various other alliances, and the
enduring legacy of promoting and supporting democracies are as central to
American foreign policy as any principle in the history of the republic. Thus, the
Princeton Project’s proposal that the pursuit of liberty under law establishes a
“grand strategy for making America more secure” merely reaffirms a deeply enshrined precept in this society’s core beliefs about foreign policy, but does not
represent a new organizing principle for U.S. strategy or a conceptual
breakthrough.
A problem with the Princeton Project’s emphasis on liberty under law and its
corollary, liberal democracy, is its decidedly imperial overtones, implying the
need to exercise imperial oversight for countries that have yet to “make the
grade” to democracy. Two prominent examples: the United States must bring
“governments up to PAR,” and Washington’s role is critical because “without
U.S. leadership and determination, the best we can hope for is a series of half
measures.” While this is not to suggest that U.S. strategy should avoid serious
commitments and responsibilities in its efforts to promote freedom and liberty,
policy makers and scholars are prudent to avoid any language or intonations
that others could interpret as evidence of an imperial design in American foreign policy. Such undercurrents only erode support for American policies.
The section on the role of force appears determined to strike out in new directions. However, most of its thinking is derived from classic approaches to strategic analysis. Beginning with the unremarkable proposition that “liberty and law
must be backed up by force,” this study proposes that the United States “should
work to sustain the military predominance of liberal democracies” in order to
“prevent a return to great power security competition.” But is it consistent,
much less prudent, as the study seems to imply, for the United States to maintain
a “high level of U.S. defense spending” while shifting decisions about military
intervention in this “cooperative rules-based order” to the judgment of such liberal democracies as, say, France?
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
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In its analysis of the role of force, the study’s conclusion that “deterrence is out
of fashion” rests on the truisms that bipolar competition between nuclear-armed
superpowers is no longer the central organizing principle of deterrence and that
the intersection of such terrorist organizations as al-Qa‘ida and nuclear weapons
is the stuff of which international catastrophes are made. It is confusing, however,
when the study declares that deterrence is no longer fashionable and then asserts
quite reasonably that “the United States must ensure that our deterrent remains
credible.” Which principle is true? Either deterrence is out of fashion or deterrent
forces must remain credible. The study’s analysis of the conditions that ought to
govern the use of force—last resort, “overwhelming confidence in the intelligence
and in the prospects for success,” the ability to “deal adequately with the aftermath,” and “approval from the U.N. Security Council” or “broadly representative
multilateral body, such as NATO” (all transparent references to the 2003 invasion
of Iraq)—is neither innovative nor terribly illuminating.
Indeed, the discussion on military force draws so heavily from present American difficulties in Iraq that its conclusions on defense planning seem more like
generalities or mere clichés than serious analytical propositions. One exception,
however, is the section that discusses the “preventive and preemptive uses of
force.” This argument is thought provoking, because it means that policy makers
should understand the differences between using preventive force against terrorists and using it against states.
This work is notable for the panoply of problems addressed and its proposed
range of solutions. Sometimes there is so much detail (almost at an engineering
level, in contrast with Kennan’s far simpler and more elegant style) that the
reader is easily distracted. Since the study virtually leaves no problem in contemporary international politics untouched, one wonders if such a broad focus
weakens the overall impact of its analysis. On the editorial level, the profusion of
clever phrases in the study, such as “bringing government up to PAR,” is unnecessary and distracting.
To understand to what extent Forging a World of Liberty under Law succeeds
in developing an intellectual architecture for American national security policy,
let us consider its strengths and weaknesses. There are several notable strengths.
The study tackles what virtually all scholars, strategists, and policy makers see
as the central intellectual challenge created by the current strategic vacuum.
Simply put, there is no more important problem to be addressed by the American national security and foreign policy communities than establishing the organizing principles of American foreign and national security policies. But
perhaps of greater analytical importance, the Princeton Project elevates one
strategic principle above all others in the conduct of foreign policy. That is, it argues, to the virtual exclusion of competing principles, that the unifying purpose
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/9
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of American policy is to promote democracy, liberty, and a shared sense of
multilateralism and cooperation. This precept correctly defines, to my mind, the
central organizing principle on which Washington ought to base its policies for
dealing with the rest of the world. The study’s emphasis on multilateralism and
cooperation is consistent with well established, if atrophied, principles in international politics. Its examination of this critical problem is, even by the standards of such studies, comprehensive and detailed. The study’s final report is
brimming with positive principles, suggestions, and policies for redefining the
core concepts in U.S. national security, reorganizing the institutions and processes that govern statecraft, and ensuring their effective implementation.
As to weaknesses, although the project’s authors planned to write a historically transcendent and innovative study, the work often borders on a pretentious
and excessively self-conscious tone. The problem is that studies become historically significant more often by accident than by deliberate intent to write a
“monumental” document. That is, it is preferable to write the study that helps to
define American strategy than to declare one’s intention to do so. Frankly, the
argument is unconvincing, as the study states, that the world is too complex for
one individual to bring order to strategy. This is, of course, the nature of conventional thinking until someone, in fact, fills the intellectual void.
One is struck, for instance, by George Kennan’s modest and elegantly written
article (only seven thousand words), which established in analytically concise
terms the basis for the Cold War policy of containment. His aim was simply to
understand and effectively counter “official Soviet conduct.” The resulting policy of containment was predicated on the “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Implicit was the principle
that the struggle with the Soviet Union ultimately threatened the survival of the
United States. By contrast, the challenges in the current international order,
while significant, hardly put at risk the survival of the United States, unless one
concludes that al-Qa‘ida’s as yet unfulfilled desire to acquire nuclear weapons
poses an existential threat to the United States. Since Forging a World of Liberty
under Law deals with a world where challenges reside more on the managerial
than the existential side of the ledger, the problem is how best to manage American power and responsibilities, not steeling the nation’s resolve to contain a military superpower bent upon our destruction.
This study’s suggested framework for American strategy, which it elevates
above other approaches in grand strategy, promotes democracy and “liberty under law.” But American strategy, at least since the end of World War II and arguably throughout the twentieth century, has been entirely and thoroughly
consistent with the broad historical architecture of promoting democratic values. As noted earlier, many instruments of American policy consciously and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2007
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explicitly promoted the development of an international order based on liberty
and freedom. To cite one prominent example, the Atlantic Charter, signed by
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 14
August 1941, declared that war was the only choice if the principles of democracy, freedom, and self-determination were to be defended (see the full text at
www.politicalresource.net/atlantic_charter.html).
More recently, President George W. Bush’s second inaugural address reaffirmed the nation’s fundamental declarative policy as one of promoting liberty
and freedom (which the study does not mention). On 20 January 2005, Bush declared that since the “survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the
success of liberty in other lands . . . it is the policy of the United States to seek and
support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation
and culture.” It is permissible to debate the finer points of its implementation,
but how much more clearly could the principle of promoting liberty and freedom be stated?
The Princeton Project argues that “the United States lacks a clear statement of
national security principles with broad bipartisan support” for governing its behavior and policies. We can debate whether the United States needs new strategic principles and whether partisanship weakens the nation’s foreign policy, but
it is difficult to defend the proposition that liberty and freedom constitute a new
strategy for the United States. In fact, the Bush administration’s decision to promote liberty and freedom as a declaratory policy is a counterpoint to the argument that promoting liberty is somehow novel. The study could be interpreted
to mean that the United States should rededicate its foreign policy to liberty and
freedom; analytically, however, this is a bit of a stretch.
This study relies unnecessarily on rhetorical flourishes to imply that current
U.S. policies are misguided and misdirected. Its authors can be forgiven for harboring this sentiment. From the occupation of Iraq, the global war on terrorism,
and general discontent with American policies globally (drawing on the analysis
presented in the working group report on anti-Americanism), one senses in
American politics a weariness among both the public and the intelligentsia. By
virtue of its discontent with the tenor and direction of American policy, the
Princeton Project manifests unhappiness with the Bush administration through
subtle yet systematic criticisms of current U.S. policies. While this tendency is
understandable, the study’s inclination to criticize current policies is disconcerting and distracting, for two reasons. First, to establish new principles for and
a bipartisan consensus on national security a study ought to draw credibility and
unanimity entirely and singularly from its analysis of international events and its
implications for the United States, rather than criticize the current policy. The
other criticism is historical in nature. Consider the neutral, analytical tone
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol60/iss3/9
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adopted by Kennan, who never criticized President Truman’s policies when, in
the late 1940s, the administration and Congress had just begun to formalize the
policy of containment. How easy it would have been to cavil as evidence
mounted that Washington lacked a coherent policy for confronting the historically daunting challenges posed by Stalin’s policies and about which Churchill
had been warning Roosevelt since 1943.*
This study’s overall impact is weakened by the uneven style in the working
group reports and the lack of evident, systematic connections with the final report. Those linkages are missing, opaque, or simply unclear. Those reports unfortunately follow their own approach and organization; their overall quality
and impact would have been immeasurably greater had they followed the same
format. For example, some contain summaries of key findings and some do not.
Some articulate major principles, some do not. This masks a more worrisome
problem, however: since the final report putatively draws substantively from the
efforts of the working groups, it is difficult to explain why disparate approaches
and styles were not discouraged.
I offer three broad principles to help scholars, policy makers, and the public
evaluate the value of Forging a World of Liberty under Law in charting new directions for American national security. One is that while this study reviews in normative terms the broad intellectual outlines of its preferred vision of American
foreign policy, it is striking and in a sense reassuring just how conventional its
thinking really is. The emphasis on promoting democratic principles is hardly
new or revolutionary, and its analysis of the principles that should guide military intervention is similarly conventional. A notable exception is the study’s
analysis of the dangers posed by what it called “major threats and challenges,”
which merit serious consideration.
In strategic terms, the study draws essentially the same conclusions previously drawn about American foreign policy. Is it perhaps the case that despite
the current partisan divide over Iraq, American policy might after all be more on
track with this polity’s historic approach to foreign policy than we realize? While
I understand that this observation is debatable, we have an obligation to acknowledge that possibility.
The project’s objective is so important in historical terms that while one can
raise serious analytic questions about its weaknesses, the broader purpose that
animated this study suggests that all observers should reflect carefully on its
* John Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (New York: W. W. Norton,
1985), reports (p. 479) that in March 1944, “The P.M. . . . said that it was now obvious our efforts to
forge a Soviet-Polish agreement had failed and that he would soon have to make a cold announcement in Parliament to this effect. It all seems to augur ill for the future of relations between this
country and the U.S.S.R.”
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arguments and conclusions. If participants in the defense and foreign policy
communities were to focus their energies on defining American strategy rather
than debating partisan differences, the tone enveloping foreign policy debates
would likely become more balanced. If this study represents an early step toward
transcending domestic differences about foreign policy, and if it helps steer
American society toward a new bipartisan consensus on grand strategy, it will
have been a significant accomplishment.
This is an important work in the field of national security. Despite several analytic weaknesses, it explicitly tackles the transcendent problem of redefining
the foundations of American grand strategy. It also contributes to the ongoing
search for new organizing principles for security at a moment when various
forces threaten U.S. security. While it has by no means resolved this central problem, Forging a World of Liberty under Law is a notable accomplishment in the
continuing intellectual search for the principles that will define American strategy in a world whose forces must be restrained.
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